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Introduction 
 
 The liberal world order is in dire straits. The world of moderately open migration, free 
trade, and free flows of capital that has existed since the 1970s is under attack. Liberal 
democracies around the world have seen the rise of far-right political parties trading in 
xenophobia, while attacking traditional liberal institutions. Many political scientists, increasingly 
committed to country-specific studies, or mid-level theories of small phenomenon are picking up 
many of these developments, while missing common threads between them.  
We are bearing witness to systemic changes. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system in 1971, the United States and its allies in the G-7 constructed a new neo-liberal world 
order characterized by relatively open migration, free trade, and free flows of capital.1 Today, 
that order is collapsing in the face of its internal contradictions. Free flows of capital, combined 
with the privileged position of the American dollar, saddled the global economy with recurrent 
financial crises. Internally, the implementation of many neoliberal policies (and creation of 
transnational workarounds) undermined many of the civil society groups vital for broad-based 
democracy. Large-scale migration, necessary to prop up entitlement spending in a low-tax 
environment, triggered the ire of far-right nationalists across the democratic world. The openness 
of the neo-liberal world order to authoritarian states, in turn, has enabled rapid growth in the 
world’s autocracies – shifting the locus of global power toward authoritarian states like China. In 
essence, my argument flows from the belief that all political orders are contingent – they rely on 
underlying power structures. The power structure that gave rise to a liberal world order are 
decaying, and an illiberal world order is taking shape.  
 Instead of the liberal world order, a new world order of embedded plutocracy is 
emerging. The rise of so-called populism represents the ascent of political coalitions advocating 
protection against some of the dislocations (real and imagined, cultural and material) caused by 
globalization, attacks on liberal institutions, with cronyism for business elites.2 Although the 
success of right-populists varies from country to country, the nationalist right has shifted the 
locus of politics in its preferred direction in many countries. Moreover, the global power shift 
toward authoritarian states will create more opportunities for illiberal governance structures to 
proliferate in coming decades. Some transnational flows, such as migration and trade, are likely 
to be tightened. Those transnational flows most conducive to the interests of business elites, such 
as capital flows, will remain open. The cross-pollination of capital flows between companies 
headquartered in the democratic and authoritarian world, the inviolability of offshore havens, and 
great power concerts may yet enable embedded plutocracy to address some global challenges 
(e.g. to avoid great power war, resolve north-south issues), even as this structure does little on 
other fronts (e.g. human rights). There is a battle between democracy and autocracy, but it is not 
being waged on the global stage as some posit3, it is being waged inside the world’s 
democracies. 
 This essay proceeds as follows. First, I explore the causes of the death of the liberal world 
order. Second, I examine Hungary, post-Brexit Britain, the United States, and Italy for evidence 
of the emergence of embedded plutocracy. Third, I offer a depiction of what embedded 
plutocracy will look like when fully developed. Finally, I address likely objections to my 
argument and offer some ideas about how to stymy creeping autocratization by increasing the 




The Strange Death of the Liberal World Order   
 At the dawn of a new era, there is nothing quite like a dirge for the old one. When John 
Ruggie wrote his iconic depiction of the Bretton Woods world order, the world he described was 
slipping away. One of the most venerable ideas in IPE is the trilemma (or impossible trinity): it is 
nice to have fixed exchange rates, the ability to use monetary policy to fight recessions, and free-
flowing capital markets.4 In practice, a country can only maintain two of the three at any given 
point in time.5 Embedded liberalism entailed fixed (but adjustable) exchange rates, and flexible 
monetary policies, while capital controls limited capital movements between countries. The 
system enabled governments to respond decisively to adverse shocks. Suffering from a 
recession? A dash of monetary stimulus will cure what ails you. Although the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) facilitated the recovery of global trade from 
Depression-era lows, world trade grew slowly, offering declining industries many opportunities 
to adjust. Labor and industry maintained a compact, wherein capital forewent large dividends, 
instead recycling corporate profits into expansion. Robust labor movements and strong civil 
society defended the lot of the worker and saw an era of democratic expansion.  
 But embedded liberalism was fraught with limitations and internal contradictions. The 
same political order that saw inequality plummet in the wealthy countries of North America, 
Western Europe, and parts of East Asia, saw between-country inequality reach incredible 
heights.6 Further, for Japan, Germany, France, and others to lead trentes glorieuses of export-led 
growth, the United States had to absorb vast quantities of imports. Not only did the relative 
growth of other economies limit the capacity of the United States to uphold Bretton Woods, the 
very strength of labor and civil society made it politically difficult for American leaders to pay 
domestic political costs to uphold the global economy. When the United States experienced a 
current account deficit in 1971, President Richard Nixon faced a choice: adopt deflationary 
policies (likely triggering a recession in 1972, an election year) or abandon fixed exchange 
rates.7 For Nixon – the consummate politician in an era where political constraints mattered – the 
choice was obvious: close the gold window. Nixon waited, however, to take full advantage of the 
new world born of the Nixon shocks, waiting until 1974 to loosen capital controls. 
What followed was an era of globalization in which the movement of goods, capital, and 
people exceeded the heights of the 19th century. The age of neo-liberalism saw the protective 
welfare state give way to a competition state. Instead of a state that protected workers and 
bestowed core necessities, the role of the state was to maximize growth. Although 
competitiveness meant eliminating some traditional protections against adjustment8, it did not 
imperil entitlement spending. Growth meant greater revenues, which could be funneled back to 
fund entitlement programs. The fluctuations of a world of mobile capital required states other 
than the United States to hold United States dollars in reserve.9 Holding the patent to the 
lubricant of the global economy transformed the United States from a declining industrial power 
to a mighty financial leader. Recycling the cheap capital provided by the world allowed 
American investors to become the world’s venture capitalist, profiting from the rise of others.10  
The fluctuations of the new age also enhanced the role of intergovernmental 
organizations, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), where American prominence is 
deeply embedded.11 Organizations like the G-7 facilitated macroeconomic coordination, as in the 
1985 Plaza and 1987 Louvre accords. Standards friendly to Anglo-American financial 
capitalism, like the Basel Capital rules, were also promoted even if they did little to foster 
stability.12 Europeans embraced regional political and economic integration with the creation of 
the European Union. The neoliberal world order saw many successes: between-country 
inequality plummeted as access to global markets facilitated the rapid growth of China and India. 
The share of extremely poor people fell from 37.1% to 9.6% between 1990 and 2015.13 Programs 
like the ambitious Millennium Development Goals, and the growth of global remittances, 
channeled funds to address some global ills. For instance, global Malaria deaths fell from 
864,000 in 2000 to 429,000 in 2015.14 The share of democratic states expanded too, particularly 
as the Soviet Union collapsed. Although much of the fanfare about the democratic enlargement 
of democracy’s “Third Wave” may have been premature – democratization efforts did not 
always succeed, and many countries have remained trapped in a gray zone between democracy 
and autocracy.15 
Despite successes, the neoliberal world order suffers from four internal contradictions: 
first, American dollar primary exposes the rest of the world to the fluctuations of American 
business cycles. Second, the political change necessary to implement neoliberal policies have 
greatly reduced the size of minimum winning coalitions, making particularist (and often illiberal) 
programs far more appealing. Third, the migration necessary to sustain entitlement programs 
without tax hikes has triggered a xenophobic backlash. Fourth, opening the neoliberal order to 
authoritarian states has allowed authoritarian successes, raising the credibility of authoritarian 
alternatives to the neoliberal order. 
Much like the 19th Century era of financial mobility, the age of neoliberalism was 
characterized by frequent, severe financial crises. Vast amounts of capital could pour into 
developing countries seeking profit and pour out just as soon. At the core of the system, too, 
America’s exorbitant privilege presented leaders with a constant temptation. With deficit-
financed tax cuts and military spending, a government could produce a temporary economic 
boom at will.16 As the United States drew on the world’s savings, capital scarcity abroad 
triggered yet more financial crises. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that Turkey’s currency crisis 
coincides with rising American interest rates, and a surge in deficit spending under President 
Trump. The spread of financial deregulation, too, meant that these capital bonanzas were not 
always transformed into productive long-term investments. Abandoned theme parks in Japan and 
low-quality McMansions in the United States are testament to our continuing vulnerability to 
animal spirits. Recurrent crises have surely undermined support for globalization, which after 
1989, replaced containment as the linchpin of the liberal world order.17  
Political developments have weakened democratic civil society, reducing the size of 
minimum winning coalitions across the west. The implementation of neoliberal policies required 
the political defeat of ‘special interests’ – labor unions, civil servants, regional interests, workers 
in import-competing industries, and others who relied on the state for protection. Yet, even if the 
goals of some special interest groups were economically inefficient, they represented organic 
communities capable of forming broad regional or sectoral political coalitions. Scholars as 
diverse as Alexis de Toqueville, Samuel Huntington, Robert Putnam, and Wendy Brown point to 
the necessity of a vital civil society for democracy.18 Labor unions, for instance, are one of the 
few interest groups capable of mobilizing middle and working-class people. In place of the 
grassroots, there is an increased tendency (particularly in the United States) for ‘astroturf 
politics’ wherein donor money funds the appearance of real civil society activity.19  
In addition, the dislocations caused by intensifying globalization are often debated in 
intergovernmental arenas that lack organic civil society organizations around them has served to 
weaken democracy. For instance, turnout in European Union parliament elections is typically 
low, and few Europeans engage in regular political discourse with those outside their country. 
Technocratic agencies like the European Council or regulators like Central Banks also enhanced 
their role in policymaking, further distancing policymaking from the public will.20   
The ways in which capital mobilizes itself politically are shifting, particularly in the 
United States. Where large financial firms once formed the basis for broad-based business 
coalitions, nowadays a few highly motivated billionaires can contribute what whole economic 
sectors once did. Although big business might collectively prefer liberal rules, each corporate 
actor by themselves will benefit far more from particularism and cronyism. In a world where 
politicians do not need to craft broad coalitions, corrupt bargains can run rampant. Billionaire 
gadflies may amplify polarization as well, by establishing litmus tests around their favored 
positions. Moreover, complex financial instruments and hedging insure wealthy individuals 
against risks in ways that ordinary people cannot match.  
Economic shifts since the financial crises limit the scope for organized civil society to 
act. For all of Steve Jobs’ invocation of new age imagery, Silicon Valley has become the land of 
would-be cartels. The smartphone is a worse computer that facilitates corporate harvests of 
consumer data and undermines the 40-hour work-week. Uber may want to overthrow taxi 
licensing guilds, but only to replace it with a monopoly employing driverless cars. Alternately, 
Taskrabbit is a platform that enables employers to use monopsony power to undermine wages. 
The political economy of Facebook and Google resembles that of resource-rich rentier state, with 
firms monopolizing control over the electronic space containing our collective data. Their ability 
to sell privileged access to parts of this commons to others is not only a source of great profit, but 
also political power. Big data makes it easier than ever to find the most gullible voters in the 
system and turn them out. As automation supplants vast proportions of the workforce, Silicon 
Valley will have an even greater incentive to redirect voter anger away from itself. Facebook 
managed to lose the data of millions of individuals, sell ads to Russian actors aiming to influence 
the election, and even served as a conduit for Burmese genocidaires to incite violence against the 
Rohingya people – without facing serious efforts at regulation.21  
 Migration benefits the liberal world order, while posing a political challenge. Migration is 
necessary for neoliberalism – young workers are needed to maintain entitlement programs 
without raising taxes, and brilliant ones are necessary to maintain the technological prowess of 
the developed world. As more and more of the world’s seven billion people have access to good 
educations, a country with 326 million people like the United States can only retain its edge by 
drawing in the brightest from abroad. Indeed, 45.3% of American STEM workers in positions 
requiring a PhD are foreign-born.22  
However, immigration is the subject of an intense political backlash.  Beginning around 
2014, nationalist anti-immigrant parties saw gains across Europe and North America.23 As of this 
writing, the United States is led by a president who won office by promising mass deportations, 
denigrating minorities and immigrants, fetishizing torture of Muslims, and promising to rip up 
the cornerstones of the liberal global order. In the European Union, right-wing populists have 
been able to reap political hay by twinning xenophobic fears of migrants (e.g. refugees from the 
Syrian civil war) with opposition to the European Union. Hungary, Italy and Poland are led by 
parties pledging a similar form of politics; Austria and the United Kingdom are led by center-
right parties captive to the far right (the latter having voted to leave the European Union); while 
many other countries have seen the far-right make significant electoral gains. Fellow travelers, 
such as President Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil have arisen by 
attacking drug addicts and LGBTQ people, respectively.  
The opposition to immigration bears little relationship to facts – xenophobes 
systematically overestimate the number of immigrants, fume over immigrant crime rates that are 
lower than the national average and imagine immigrants as spongers when their presence is 
necessary for the vitality of the tax base. At times, politicians might portray opposition to 
immigration as a means to combat intolerance. For instance, Pim Fortuyn won support in the 
Netherlands by attacking Muslims as being insufficiently liberal for Dutch society. Darker 
ruminations emerge, too, as nativists fear that the political power of immigrants and minorities 
will overtake their own. In the United States and Western Europe, defenders of inequality have 
been effective at using the ignorance and xenophobia of voters to build political coalitions that 
are more robust to the dislocations of an age of crises. 
Some are skeptical of the connection between different populist movements. For 
instance, Lawrence Freedman24 contests whether the Brexit vote has the same meaning as the 
election victory of Donald Trump. Whereas the former was a referendum on a question with 
unclear implications (e.g. a soft vs. a hard Brexit), the latter was a national election held on a 
range of questions. Yet although populist right parties often appear to respond to idiosyncratic, 
country-specific concerns, they have much in common. Every single right-populist party 
harnessed outgroup hostility as a core part of their campaign. When Nigel Farage campaigned 
for ‘Leave’ he stood in front of a sign reading “breaking point,” depicting an endless stream 
Syrian refugees. The best predictor of support for ‘Leave’ and for President Trump was the very 
same: outgroup hostility.25 Even if the targets vary across countries, the populist right is united 
by its exploitation of a political vulnerability of liberal democracy. By protecting individual 
rights against the tyranny of the majority, all liberal democracies are vulnerable to populist 
attacks. Attacks on the judiciary or pardons for civil rights violators in the United States, Poland, 
Hungary, and the Philippines can be presented as actions reflecting the popular will. Liberal 
democrats may end up being forced to defend unpopular targets. To use the words of Hungarian 
Prime Minister Viktor Orban, ‘illiberal democracy’ is a politically viable alternative to liberal 
democracy.26  
 The simultaneous transformation of global power represents a third contradiction to the 
liberal order.27 Neoliberalism produced wealth in part by opening up the world economy to 
fundamentally illiberal regimes like China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. Even though there are 
more democracies today than before, the relative economic power of authoritarian states is 
rising. Instead of a global power structure dominated by a uniformly liberal G-7, global 
governance increasingly takes place through a G-20 which includes many authoritarian, hybrid, 
or flawed democratic regimes. If the projections of PriceWaterhouseCoopers hold true, by 2030 
authoritarian and democratic regimes will represent equal shares of global GDP (See Figure 1).  
[Figure 1 about here] 
There are reasons to believe that autocratization will intensify in coming decades. 
Systemic factors exhibit consistent influence on which domestic political systems prevail. For 
instance, the ‘Third Wave’ of democratization running from the mid-1970s to the 1990s saw 
many countries democratize as the Soviet Union declined as a viable global contender.28 What 
began as superficial democratization aimed at limiting international criticism, in some cases 
created openings for those desiring genuine democracy.  
The Chinese economic and political model is a viable example for others to emulate.29 
While global capital flows were predominantly north-north even a decade ago, the global south 
surpassed the north as an investment destination in 2014, while growing rapidly as a source of 
capital too. Homeowners (though not renters) in global cities have been the beneficiaries of this 
source of largesse, as low U.S. interest rates saw a turn from U.S. bonds to real estate as a safe 
store of value. Beijing is exerting more influence in institutions, while creating its own.30 For 
countries inclined toward clientelistic relationships between business and government, Beijing’s 
rules may prove preferable to Washington’s. Further, states trying to attract capital in an 
authoritarian world may adopt institutions that are complementary to large authoritarian capital 
exporters.  
Finally, many of the institutions undergirding the liberal world order reflect a different 
geopolitical reality than the one emerging today. NATO, and similar security arrangements in 
East Asia, were built up around a genuine fear of Soviet expansionism.31 The rise of China is a 
geopolitical phenomenon presenting threats and opportunities for states woven into the liberal 
order. The front lines of potential superpower confrontations are different from those of the Cold 
War. Moreover, unlike the Soviet Union, China is a potential source of capital and trade to 
others. To a certain degree, Russia’s election meddling and land-grabs may actually reinforce the 
rivalry that long nurtured the liberal order. There is no enemy like the old enemy. 
 The developments unravelling the liberal world order reinforce one another. Financial 
crises and the responses to crises (whether austerity or stimulus) are major distributional events 
that rejig power structures and challenge ideas about ‘the way the world works.’32 Appeals to 
nativism may be more successful in a world where voters are increasingly uncertain about 
whether the economic system works. Indeed, in the United States, Republican assessments of the 
state of the economy have almost entirely been swallowed by partisanship.33 At the level of 
elites, wealthy interests may be more willing to throw their vast resources behind illiberal 
xenophobes if the alternative is redistribution and regulation.34  
 As minimum winning coalitions shrink, opportunities arise for actors in authoritarian 
countries to influence the politics of democratic ones. The role of Russian spying and hacking in 
the 2016 US presidential election has received a great deal of attention, but there are subtler 
ways to exert influence in a world where political coalitions represent networks of contradictory, 
parochial interests. Since the 2016 election, a number of foreign interests sought to influence 
American policy by establishing direct links with the Trump Organization. For instance, the 
Chinese government loaned $500 million to Indonesia for a development plan that included 
construction of a Trump golf course, just as President Trump announced the end of restrictions 
on ZTE, a Chinese Telecom Company North Korea criticized for exporting US technology to 
North Korea and Iran.35 One Italian deputy at the Council of Europe was found to have been on 
the payroll of the government of Azerbaijan.36 The use of similar offshore accounts to evade 
taxes can link the interests of oligarchs and democratic politicians alike. The release of the 
Panama Papers embarrassed figures as diverse as Russian President Vladimir Putin, British 
Prime Minister David Cameron, and Icelandic Prime Minister Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson. 
Conversely, corporations headquartered in democratic states are becoming increasingly active in 
authoritarian states – requiring them to adapt themselves to local conditions.  
 The ‘boomerang effect’37 once touted as a means to promote human rights can have the 
exact opposite effect in the face of networks of nationalist and authoritarian actors.38 
Authoritarian infiltration of democratic polities can create non-compliance constituencies that 
will push against the international reproach of governments for human rights violations. 
Authoritarian governments can impose costs on governments that push too hard. For instance, 
after Liu Xiaobo won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010, the Chinese government retaliated against 
Norway by cancelling planned meetings and sidelining trade talks. When the Canadian 
government criticized the Saudi arrest of civil rights activists, the Saudi government retaliated by 
pulling Saudi students out of Canada. Where the democratic world might have stood together, 
none came to the assistance of Norway or Canada. Indeed, not long after its spat with Canada, a 
Saudi journalist (with American residence) disappeared after visiting the Saudi consulate in 
Turkey. Despite indications that Jamal Khashoggi was murdered by the order of Crown Prince 
Muhammad bin Salman. Instead of declaring civis Americanus sum, President Trump was 
obsequious, aiming to grant cover to Saudi actions in defense of petrodollar recycling and arms 
sales to Saudi Arabia. I do not mean to suggest that it is new that democratic states often trade 
their highest values for filthy lucre, but rather to illustrate how a changing global power structure 
is moving the goalposts. What is more, the global normalization of authoritarian values works in 
reverse too, creating space for illiberal democrats and nationalists to push against human rights at 
home.  
 
Evidence: Embedded Plutocracy inside four populist movements 
 Let us turn to some of the more high-profile instances in which right-populists have taken 
power in recent years, namely Hungary under Viktor Orbán, post-Brexit Britain, the United 
States under Trump, and Italy under the Lega-Five Star coalition. These cases exhibit important 
commonalities – transnational networks of dark money and polarized political systems that 
promote nationalist outbidding. In power, the agenda of right-populist governments have enacted 





 Hungary is the canary in the coalmine of right-populism. Together with its junior partner, 
the KDNP, Orbán’s government win a two thirds majority in 2010, in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis. Orbán underwent a long journey from a long-haired pro-democracy dissident in 
1990, to a center-right Prime Minister in 1998-2002, to a champion of “illiberal democracy” 
today.  
In power, Fidesz used both heterodox and orthodox tools to slash large budget deficits, 
and reward regime insiders. Orbán implemented a 16% flat tax (coupled with the highest VAT 
tax in Europe), imposed a tax on foreign companies in some sectors (including media and 
banking), and nationalized public pensions.39 Public institutions were increasingly used to 
disburse funds to a network of business leaders tied to the party, long cultivated by Orbán and 
businessman Lajos Simicka. Public contracts represent 26% of all spending on print media in 
Hungary, benefitting regime insiders and also extending the government’s control. For instance, 
loans from Hungary’s exim bank were used to support the takeover of Hungary’s second-largest 
tv station by Andy Vajna, a wealthy pro-Fidesz businessman (and the producer of films 
including Rambo). In the words of some Fidesz leaders the aim is to create what Andras Lánczi 
has called a “patriotic cohort of entrepreneurs”.40   
 In the 2014 Hungarian election, Fidesz won reelection, but lost support to Jobbik, another 
far-right party, and a unity coalition of liberal, green, and pro-European parties. However, Orbán 
had developed numerous tools to enhance his popularity, while continuing to favor insider 
firms.41 Orbán took advantage of the Syrian refugee crisis to stoke nationalist fears, pledging to 
build a fence to cut off access to migrants. George Soros, a wealthy Hungarian-American 
financier has also featured prominently as a bugbear for Orbán, who has invoked anti-Semitic 
tones while attempting to shut down the Soros-backed Central European University.42 When 
seeking to broaden his economic agenda, Orbán has opted for welfare chauvinism – recently 
proposing the abolition of taxes on women with four or more children.43 At the same time, Orbán 
used the cloak of nationalism to justify increasing democratic backsliding – Freedom House44 
now rates Hungary as only “partly free.” Moreover, in a climate defined by hostility to 
migration, the primary opposition to Fidesz comes from Jobbik, a party with a far-right history of 




 Unlike Hungary, right-populists came to influence British politics through a referendum, 
not an election. The Brexit campaign is often portrayed45 as a battle between everyman 
“somewheres” and cosmopolitan “anywheres.” This portrayal is misleading. The promise of a 
Brexit referendum itself emerged as part of an attempt by British Prime Minister David Cameron 
to coopt rising support for the populist United Kingdom Independence Party, so as to continue 
his own austerity agenda. The majority of financing for the Brexit referendum campaign came 
from just 100 individual donors, including many pro-Brexit “anywheres.”46 One of the largest 
donors was Arron Banks, the CEO of an insurance company, who singlehandedly donated over 
£8 million to pro-Brexit organizations, particularly Leave.EU, a campaign group he co-founded. 
Questions have arisen over Banks’ true motivations. Shortly after founding Leave.EU, Banks 
was offered the opportunity to invest in the consolidation of six Russian gold mines following a 
lunch with the Russian ambassador.47  
 The potential role of Cambridge Analytica, a political consultancy founded by hedge 
fund manager Robert Mercer, in the Brexit campaign poses additional questions about the leave 
campaign. Cambridge Analytica obtained data from millions of Facebook profiles, which it used 
to construct detailed psychographic profiles of individuals – including those susceptible to 
believing falsehoods. Four different pro-Brexit organizations, including Vote Leave, BeLeave, 
Veterans for Britain, and Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party hired AggregateIQ, an 
obscure Canadian political consultancy to spend a large proportion of their campaign budget.48 
According to a Cambridge Analytica whistleblower, Chris Wylie, Cambridge Analytica and 
AggregateIQ are linked to the same parent company, SCL, and both employ the same underlying 
technology.49 Wylie also indicated that Cambridge Analytica employees shared detailed 
discussions of the firm’s technology with the sanctioned Russian oil company Lukoil. In light of 
the links between business and politics in Russia, and subsequent Russian efforts to influence 
elections in Britain and the United States, any disclosure of information would be distressing. 
Whether or not the presence of a transnational network of actors proved critical in the Leave 
victory, it is not difficult to imagine similar constellations of forces playing a powerful role in 
future campaigns.  
Pro-remain Conservatives, including Prime Minister Theresa May have pushed for a 
negotiated ‘soft’ Brexit, in which Britain would accept most European Union rules and pay 
billions of pounds, in exchange for concessions to ease the transition, such as continued access to 
the European common market. However, a number of pro-Brexit hardliners have pushed instead 
for a ‘hard’ Brexit, in which Britain would abruptly cease its membership in the EU, leaving the 
country in a state of regulatory uncertainty, and imposing steep transitional costs. Bank of 
England stress tests indicate that this could cause as much as an 8% fall in GDP.50 
Rather than urging for a cozy Bretton-Woods part II, the dominant model for post-Brexit 
Britain touted by Brexit hardliners including Boris Johnson, Michael Gove, Owen Johnson, 
Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt, and wealthy entrepreneur James Dyson is Singapore-on-
Thames.51 Diversified business holdings and ownership of mobile assets insures some hard 
Brexiteers from the consequences of post-Brexit chaos. One Tory MP, Sir John Redwood, urged 
a no deal Brexit, while shifting his own personal investment assets out of the United Kingdom.52 
MP, Jacob Rees-Mogg is the owner of a Singapore-based investment fund, Somerset Capital, 
even as he urges a no deal Brexit. One wonders whether Rees-Mogg is following the advice of 
his father, whose books Blood in the Streets: Investment Profits in a World Gone Mad, and The 
Sovereign Individual: Mastering the Transition to the Information Age promote the idea that 
nimble “sovereign individuals” can profit amidst collapse in an age of volatility.  
 
The United States, 2016- 
 The United States has long incubated key elements of embedded plutocracy. Since the 
1990s, a media eco system including far-right radio stations, Fox News, and right-wing activists 
online have cheered on the rightward drift of the Republican party. One analysis of the network 
of linkages between news stories on immigration found clear evidence of a right-wing media eco 
system, divorced from mainstream sources.53  
Rising income inequality, and Supreme Court rulings favorable to unlimited campaign 
donations, have enabled wealthy, highly motivated individuals to intervene in politics to an 
unprecedented degree. Indeed, some analyses by political scientists find that controlling for 
interest group preferences and the preferences of wealthy voters, median voter preferences do not 
impact policy outcomes.54 Some billionaires have become famous for their political activism. 
Charles and David Koch, scions of Koch Industries, have a long history of supporting libertarian 
and conservative thinktanks, as well as the anti-stimulus Tea Party movement.55 Las Vegas 
casino owner, Sheldon Adelson, donates large amounts of money to candidates that endorse a 
foreign policy consistent with the goals of Israel’s Likud party.56 According to the most 
comprehensive study of billionaires in American politics, the bulk of billionaire-activism takes 
place in opposition to higher taxes, though some liberal billionaires such as Thomas Steyer are 
politically active – deepening polarization further.57 
 Although donors have extensive agenda-setting power, they cannot always determine 
political outcomes. In the 2016 Republican Primary, Donald Trump used his celebrity status to 
hijack the right-wing infosphere and effectively outbid other candidates, particularly by 
appealing to the racial animus and xenophobia of primary voters.58 Once Trump won the 
nomination, he received the assistance of many of the elements of the same transnational 
network that helped “leave” win the Brexit, including Cambridge Analytica and Russian 
interference.59 The Trump campaign was able to effectively target its message at different voters 
– appearing to some as a useful tool to implement a traditional Republican agenda, and to others 
as their champion against immigration and demographic change in the United States. At times 
Trump made appeals to economic populism as well, promising to go after “hedge fund guys,” 
criticizing free trade, and pledging to create jobs with large infrastructure programs.   
 In office, Trump promptly filled his cabinet with scions of big business network and his 
own personal business interests. Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, was the former CEO of Exxon 
Mobil; Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin is a Goldman Sachs alumnus; Commerce Secretary, 
Wilbur Ross, is a billionaire investor in steel concerns; Education Secretary, Betsy Devos, is a 
billionaire whose husband was CEO of Amway. Other key appointments have clear ties to 
wealthy interests. Prior to serving as Trump’s third National Security advisor, John Bolton ran a 
hawkish super PAC financed by billionaire Robert Mercer.60 Trump’s son-in-law, wealthy real 
estate investor Jared Kushner, has also played an important advisory role within the 
administration.  
 The signature economic policy of the Trump administration has been a major cut to 
income and corporate taxes (from 35 to 21 percent).61 The primarily beneficiaries of the former 
cut have been wealthy individuals. On smaller issues, too, the Trump agenda has looked more 
plutocratic than populist. At the urging of billionaire investor Carl Icahn, an early Trump backer 
who also started a $150 million SuperPac, Trump lowered the corporate repatriation tax.62 
Congress has also weakened the provisions of the Dodd-Frank act, with support from the 
administration, raising the cutoff for “systemically important” financial institutions to $250 
billion. Trump’s appointee to the Federal Commerce Commission, Ajit Pai, voted to repeal net 
neutrality rules, allowing internet service providers to charge different rates to different 
consumers.63     
 While Trump has enthusiastically pursued the social elements of his populist agenda, he 
has eschewed actions that might alienate his plutocratic allies. As President, Trump pushed for a 
ban on immigration from a number of predominantly Muslim countries (though the list excludes 
countries where his company has properties); zero tolerance border policies that have resulted in 
family separation; a quest for a border wall (even at the cost of triggering a government 
shutdown); banned transgender people from serving in the military; while hewing to traditional 
policy objectives of social conservatives, and frequent Twitter fights on polarizing cultural 
issues.64 On the other hand, promises to increase infrastructure spending and to close the carried 
interest provision are stillborn as of this writing.  
Trade is one area featuring departures by the Trump administration from traditional GOP 
support for free trade. In office, Trump levied tariffs on China, coupled with targeted tariffs on 
Canadian and Mexican steel. This is an important reminder that embedded plutocracy differs 
from a broadly pro-business agenda. Although economic theory predicts that protectionism is 
welfare-reducing overall, the winners of trade tend to be diffuse groups (e.g. consumers), while 
the losers represent concentrated interests (e.g. import-competing firms).65 Trump’s inner circle 
consists largely of business interests that are import-competing (e.g. Ross and steel) or not 
strongly impacted by tariffs (e.g. Trump and real estate, or Devos and Amway). Although a trade 
war would be harmful for some pro-Trump groups, such as farmers, side payments can soften the 
blow.66 In an environment characterized by increasingly fragmented interests, even a signature 
populist policy like protectionism can yet become a vehicle for corporate welfare. 
 
Italy, 2018- 
The long and scandal-ridden government67 of Silvio Berlusconi. The billionaire leader of 
Italy’s center-right Forza Italia, and a media magnate controlling as much as 90% of the Italian 
television market,68 Berlusconi served as Prime Minister from 1994-95, 2001-2006, and 2008-
2011. When in power, Berlusconi has governed in coalition with Lega Nord, a northern 
separatist party known for its blistering attacks on southern Italy. Following the 2008 financial 
crisis, Berlusconi was left to deal with the fallout of Italy’s debt crisis. This proved difficult, and 
in 2011, Berlusconi resigned and was replaced as Prime Minister by a technocratic government 
led by economist, Mario Monti. Both Monti and the center-left government following it 
continued an unpopular austerity agenda in response to the debt crisis, while the increased 
monitoring role over budgets exercised by the European Commission linked the economic pain 
of a severe crisis to the European Union. In 2014, the simultaneous eruption of the migration 
crisis, deepened negative views of Europe and globalization. In 2009, Italians considered 
globalization more an opportunity (42%) than a threat (40%) – by 2012 the threat frame was 
ahead 48%-28%.69 Similarly, in 2009 more Italians had a positive (56%) than negative (10%) 
view of the European Union, while large majorities expressed hostile views toward immigration.  
Much as Donald Trump outbid conventional Republicans, the Lega has cannibalized 
much of the traditional support of the center-right. Following Bossi’s resignation on corruption 
charges, new leader Matteo Salvini steered the party from a northern league to a national one. 
Content analysis of Salvini’s Facebook posts illustrate a consistent migration away from 
emphasis on themes such as northern values, and toward an emphasis on national issues like 
security, terrorism, and immigration.70 The central economic policy proposal of the Lega is one 
that reconciles the party’s business interests with its Euroskeptic agenda. The party favors a 15% 
flat tax, which would deepen Italy’s budget deficit while benefitting wealthy taxpayers. Like 
Silvio Berlusconi before him, Salvini also favors a pro-Russian foreign policy even endorsing 
Russia’s claim on Crimea. In effect, the Lega favors a pro-rich anti-austerity agenda. Although 
its Five Star coalition partners are larger, Lega ministers benefit from far greater experience in 
politics. As Interior Minister, Salvini has led a popular crusade against migration, as his party has 
overtaken the Five Star movement in the polls.71 
In short, while there are many important idiosyncratic factors in the rise of populism, 
there are also some important similarities. Polarized media and a correspondingly polarized 
politics have created conditions where right-populists can often outbid or coopt conventional 
center-right parties through nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric. Right-populists in power have 
retained or even doubled down on the pro-rich redistributive agenda of traditional right-of-center 
parties. Yet, right-populists often aim to achieve those results through not only tax cuts, but also 
particularist arrangements that may benefit only a few insiders.  
 
Embedded Plutocracy: The New World Order 
 So far, we have only seen the very beginning of right-populist rule. With the neoliberal 
world order fraying at the edges, it is also useful to think about how a more advanced populist 
world might look like. Like John Ruggie, I believe that political authority in the international 
system reflects “a fusion of power with legitimate social purpose.”72 Often, such transformations 
have occurred in the aftermath of major wars, or during periods where the global power structure 
was strongly reified, however, allowing the leading power and its allies to inject their own vision 
of legitimate social purpose into the fabric of the system. The question of what emerges in a 
world in which geopolitical power is increasingly diffuse, and social purpose globally contested?  
 Although the policy ramifications of shifts to the global power structure are still in flux, 
the political foundations of the new order are clear: inside democracies diffuse interests are 
losing against the combined clout of incumbent business interests and single-issue voters. 
Globally, shifts in the distribution of power are affording more power to autocrats, and more 
diplomatic cover to would-be autocrats. The kind of world order most compatible with this state 
of affairs is what I will call embedded plutocracy (see table 1). Like the Bretton Woods era, the 
state will act to limit aspects of globalization that might cause dislocation. Unlike the Bretton 
Woods era the primary beneficiaries of state intervention will be large incumbent firms and 
regime insiders, allied to coalitions of single-issue voters (e.g. nativists).  
[Table 1 about here] 
 While neoliberalism was characterized by free flows of capital, free trade, and increased 
migration, embedded plutocracy entails continued financial openness, targeted protectionism, 
and hard limits on migration. In essence, global economic processes will be restricted in direct 
order of how politically controversial they are. Political entrepreneurs will aim to get the biggest 
bang for their buck. Big data will enable political parties to determine which voters can be won 
over for the smallest political cost. Political parties representing some combination of the leading 
incumbent firms, xenophobes, and a gaggle of single-issue voters will have an immense 
advantage in the 21st century. 
 Nativist voters are a compelling example (though not the sole case) of voters that might 
be mobilized with relatively little expenditure of political capital.73 In a sense, xenophobes are 
virtual reality voters. For instance, most surveys find that voters systematically overestimate the 
proportion of foreign-born individuals in their own country.74 Similarly, although immigrants 
commit fewer crimes than natives75, and even undocumented immigrants may be net contributors 
to government revenues,76 many nativists believe the reverse. It is easy to push the buttons of 
nativist voters once you know who they are. One study pointed to pathogen sensitivity as a 
consistent predictor of nativism. Politicians might refer to ‘infestation’ by immigrants, arousing 
the fears of such voters.77 Courting nativist voters also enables the replacement of the welfare 
state with welfare chauvinism – welfare for “deserving” in-group members, but not others.78 
Such programs can be implemented with less political capital than universal programs.  
Who is against nativism? Immigrants themselves might favor open migration, however, 
they often lack the rights of citizenship rights and the path to naturalization can be long. Second-
generation immigrants lack material reasons to support open migration policies. In the early 20th 
century, plenty of Americans with Swedish, German, Irish, and Italian names happily supported 
restrictions on immigration. Although capital benefits from open immigration, the benefits of a 
slightly larger labor market pale in comparison to other issues. Capital taxation is simply far 
more salient for big business than immigration, even if business still mobilized primarily through 
broad-based forums instead of narrow ones. Certainly, some individuals of conscience or civil 
rights organizations might find common cause with pro-immigration groups. But if there is one 
iron law of politics it is that concentrated groups with intense preferences prevail over diffuse 
ones with only modest commitments to a particular issue.79 
Tighter migration controls will have important effects on the global political economy. 
Rising powers like China and India will benefit immensely – retaining their best and brightest, 
just as they are in a position to begin to establish globally competitive educational institutions. 
The United States, in turn, will be unable to retain its role as a leading global innovator without 
migration. Yet American policymakers can compensate for lost competitiveness in the short-run 
by altering the structure of American hegemony yet again, as will be discussed when I turn to 
trade.  
 Some aspects of economic globalization will remain politically untouchable. The 
implementation of capital controls runs counter to the interests of the large corporations whose 
acquiescence is essential to bankroll political victory. For capital, mobility is a vital safeguard 
against expropriation. The main cost of mobility is that it limits the ability of governments to use 
monetary policy to combat financial crises. However, by relying on political coalitions of highly 
mobilized single-issue voters and business elites, democratic governments will be increasingly 
able to weather recessions and financial crises – much as the limited franchise helped many 
countries maintain the gold standard in the face of crises in the 19th century. 
The implications of free flows of capital will also be different in the era of embedded 
plutocracy than in the neoliberal era. Autocratic regimes – particularly China – will represent 
increasing sources of capital. As before, potential host countries will need to signal that they are 
likely to protect the property rights of foreign investors.80 Although they might do so by 
establishing transparent institutions and strong rules, other paths will be available. For instance, a 
country like the Philippines, is likely to be a host of Chinese investment for geographic reasons. 
Filipino political leaders might signal the credibility of the Philippines in protecting the property 
rights of Chinese investors by joining the networks of relationships that characterize Guangxi 
capitalism. Taking bribes and maintaining patronage relationships can credibly signal good 
intentions just as much as strong property rights.81   
In order to protect far-flung investments, Chinese investors will also press the Chinese 
government to expand Chinese reach capacity. The development of a blue water navy capable of 
projecting power across the Indian Ocean and requisite naval bases is already a Chinese priority 
– the string of pearls to accompany One-Belt-One-Road. Greater Chinese power projection 
capabilities, in turn, will allow China to expand its own bloc of dependent states.   
Even aside from the draw of authoritarian investment, authoritarian states can provide 
cover to aspiring autocrats abroad. Moves like the denaturalization of naturalized citizens, voter 
disenfranchisement, or gerrymandering might ordinarily risk international condemnation. But in 
a world where regime type is more mixed, it might be easy to defend autocratization by simply 
saying ‘there are many ways to be democratic, let a thousand flowers bloom.’  
I am not arguing that currently liberal democratic states will become totalitarian states. 
However, they are likely to converge upon an equilibrium that is less liberal and less democratic 
(at least in the sense of governments justifying policy to the public, and of all people having a 
meaningful impact on public policy). Indeed, there are some limiting factors on globally driven 
autocratization. For the United States, liberal institutions will still reinforce the desirability of the 
United States dollar as the global reserve currency over a state with no constraints against large-
scale expropriation.  
 As American high-technology exports decline, the United States can use market access as 
a wedge to demand leverage from others.82 Such actions could benefit import-competing firms, 
while privileged access to some markets in the American sphere might benefit some export-
oriented firms. President Donald Trump’s trade war with China, Europe, and Canada represents 
an early example of this strategy in action. In time, aiming to prevent ad hoc trade wars, the 
states most dependent on access to American markets may opt for negotiated settlements 
offering American goods a privileged position. States powerful enough to have their own 
dependents are likely to balk at such propositions instead forming their own rival trade blocs. 
Even if this is bad for their aggregate welfare, it offers rising powers the prospect of appeasing 
exporters while assuaging import-competing firms. 
 Doubtless, some domestic and global actors are likely to push against protectionism. 
Export-oriented sectors might defend the old order, but some will prefer having privileged roles 
inside trading blocs. Broader beneficiaries from trade, like consumers, were hard to mobilize 
even in the best of times and aren’t likely to do much in a world where minimum winning 
coalitions are shrinking. International organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
too, might allow some states to resist protectionism. But the primary WTO enforcement 
mechanism – reciprocal tariffs – is fundamentally a weapon of the strong. Small states are more 
trade-dependent than large ones and can do very little economic damage to large ones by 
responding to tariffs with counter-tariffs.83  
 As the global power structure shifts, international institutions will reflect the powerful 
states that dominate them. On some issues – including human rights, governance standards, and 
north-south issues – there will be much less cooperation. For instance, it is difficult to imagine a 
solution to climate change taking place through a great power concert, particularly if the 
companies that emit much of the world’s CO2 are part of the selectorate of the parties at the 
table. On the other hand, it is possible to imagine a great power concert to avoid the ‘Thucydides 
trap.’ Global institutions, like the United Nations, might operate primarily as forums for 
conversation rather than as a kind of global government. Sovereignty would rule the roost once 
more. The sanctity of offshore money deposited by oligarchs in authoritarian states and large 
corporations in democratic ones would represent a kind of suicide pact for elites. War, by risking 
the assets of the selectorate, would be unthinkable. Although nativist sentiments might foreclose 
other palliatives against conflict, such as elite inter-marriage. 
 Embedded plutocracy contains contradictions of its own. Coalitions of single-issue voters 
will gradually be more difficult to construct if the concerns of such voters are met. For instance, 
immigration restrictions might reduce the salience of immigration over time. Big data may lose 
some of its utility as citizens adapt their behavior. Third way coalitions might assuage some of 
the concerns of nativists or the interests of embedded plutocrats, while issuing a return to a more 
open world.  
 
Possible objections  
 I foresee some likely objections to my argument. Some might argue that liberal 
democratic institutions are strong in most current democracies. The current populism is a flash-
in-the-pan – likely to die down once Donald Trump leaves office, or once the salience of the 
Syrian refugee ‘crisis’ diminishes. Big business is likely to push back against serious efforts to 
alter the status quo with respect to globalization. Big Data represents an equal opportunity across 
the political spectrum – left, right, pro-globalization, and anti-globalization can all use the same 
tools to mobilize supporters. Even if some issues prove highly salient, non-populist parties can 
coopt the positions of populists to some degree.  
I am not convinced. From a historical perspective liberal democracy is a flash-in-the-pan. 
As recently as 1963, Americans considered their President ‘leader of the free world’ even as 
millions of African-Americans were disenfranchised by segregationist institutions. Even if 
populist politicians vanished, partisans of many right-wing parties remain committed to 
immigration restriction. Politicians courting them are likely to fare well. Big business has not 
stopped the US-China trade war, the Brexit, or the formation of an all-populist coalition in Italy. 
And big data inherently benefits those seeking to build coalitions around intensely held values 
and identities. Individual rights and free trade appeal to diffuse coalitions, while upsetting 
concentrated ones.  
Some might object to predictions of a transition to a more authoritarian international 
system. Perhaps Chinese growth will plateau as democratic India soars, or perhaps China and 
others might take steps towards democratization. Even if China becomes increasingly powerful, 
it may be difficult for a Beijing consensus to take shape. Liberal great powers on the other hand, 
have a good record of crafting international coalitions during major wars. American hegemony 
may outlive American power – the United States surpassed British GDP in 1872, yet the United 
States did not usurp Britain’s global role till 1941. Perhaps the rules that define the international 
order are strong enough to outlast global power transitions, and the liberal order need only to 
reconfigure its mission.84  
Once again, I am skeptical. India has yet to manifest as a democratic superpower. 
Although Chinese growth is slowing, India is not clearly growing faster. Moreover, India is 
undergoing modest democratic backsliding itself. In 2014, it elected a Hindu Nationalist Prime 
Minister whose tenure as Chief Minister of Gujurat saw many accuse him of complicity in anti-
Muslim riots. According to the Varieties of Democracy Project85, as many countries are 
undergoing democratic backsliding as are becoming more democratic (and the only region where 
democracy and free trade is advancing – Sub-Saharan Africa – lacks great powers). Moreover, 
many of the ‘liberal’ powers able to craft grand alliances were oligarchies, not real democracies. 
During the Napoleonic Wars, only 2.5% of the British metropolitan population (not to mention 
the colonies) could vote. By the First World War, that number was still only 35%.86 Even an 
authoritarian state like China possesses political constraints that might credibly signal intentions 
to other actors.  
As for the power of rule-based international orders, rules change. The Concert of Vienna 
fell apart after Napoleon III split Russia off from Prussia and Austria. The League of Nations 
collapsed when the Second World War broke out. The Bretton Woods system died when the 
costs of maintaining it grew too high for the United States. Rules-based order is often the 
exercise of power by some over others. Rules-based orders rarely outlive the power structures 
that gave them life.  
Embedded plutocracy will not take root everywhere. Some countries may be able to resist 
these trends for a few reasons. Sensible regulations on financial institutions, and robust responses 
to financial crises when they occur can protect citizens from the destabilization of recurrent 
crises to some degree. Those countries with vibrant civil societies, and organizations capable of 
mobilizing broad swathes of the public to defend democracy and individual rights may defeat 
creeping autocracy. Strict campaign finance laws and rules protecting the privacy of data might 
head off the shrinking of the democratic selectorate (although these are difficult issues to 
mobilize voters around, and it is hard to regulate increasingly transnational campaigns). Clear 
overreach and abuses by monopolist or monopsonist new industry firms might trigger backlash, 
leading to an outcome where big firms saw themselves either regulated like utilities or even 
broken up.87 Liberal grand coalitions may yet form domestically and internationally, enunciating 
compelling rebuttals to xenophobes.  
Some posit that dire consequences might be avoided with a return to something like 
embedded liberalism. Following the tradition of Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation, one 
argument posits that extreme market societies are unnatural, prompting counter-movements.88 
Some combination of social democracy and limits to globalization, then, might have preventive 
effects on the rise of authoritarianism. Yet it is not clear that robust welfare states are a palliative 
against xenophobia. Some of the states that have avoided the rise of a powerful far-right are 
fairly market-oriented (e.g. Australia), while some with extensive welfare states (e.g. France and 
Denmark) have seen intensified xenophobic politics.89 Moreover, the closure of states to global 
flows will not end hostility to immigration. Much of the western hemisphere went from being 
extremely open to immigration in the late 19th century, to being extremely closed by the 1920s.90 
These policy shifts did little to eliminate opportunities for nativist politics.  
Perhaps a liberal world that is moderately closed to illiberal regimes might be a stronger 
one. Viktor Orbán happily accepts financial transfers from the European Union, even as he 
shreds Hungarian democracy. Oligarchs can happily store their ill-gotten gains in liberal 
democratic countries that protect their property. Openness to closed regimes might have once 
been justified on the grounds of modernization theory – trade and economic progress will lead to 
democratization.91 Rather, modernization has often shored up the legitimacy of authoritarian 
regimes, as in China. Elsewhere, economic modernization has often triggered social disruption 
and internal conflict. In Brazil, the Philippines, and India recent periods of rapid growth have 
been capped with the rise of Bolsonaro, Duterte, and Modi, respectively. This is hardly a ringing 
endorsement of the democratizing effects of economic progress.  
A renewed Cold War will solve all of our problems. There are many institutions wherein 
broad inclusion serves important global functions (e.g. the United Nations, the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, etc.). Dense economic interactions between authoritarian and democratic 
countries may, in addition, promote peace by raising the cost of war. At the same time, there is 
be room to accomplish those objectives while also increasing the democratic premium – the 
advantage granted to fellow democracies vis-à-vis authoritarian states. Doing so could help 
clarify the purpose of the liberal world order as an organic community of fellow democracies, 
instead of some technocratic bugbear. Economic interests often undergird debates about 
alliances, after all.92 In particular, making enforceable labor rights provisions of access to 
markets can dampen some of the objections to internationalism often exploited by the populist 
right. Finally, the dense network of offshore investments revealed by the Panama Papers present 
an obvious case for regulation. So long as oligarchs can benefits from state plunder while 
enjoying the property rights protection afforded them by offshore accounts, autocrats will have 
their cake and eat it too.     
 
Conclusion 
 The age of democracy – and particularly liberal democracy with universal suffrage – is a 
tiny blip in the scope of human history.93 Institutions and practices that Americans in particular 
imagine to be timeless and permanent are recent and contingent developments. Democracy 
doesn’t die in darkness, it dies in weakness. The post-Bretton Woods neoliberal order served the 
goals of a particular time and place. In the process, it facilitated a transformation to the political 
system into something new, very much at cross-purposes to its initial ideas. Embedded 
plutocracy is the result. 
 In the face of the democratic twilight, political scientists must consider that a political 
order inimical to our profession is on the rise. Vital questions of domestic and international 
political economy need to be addressed. How can we construct a globalization that promotes 
peace and prosperity without recurrent financial crises? How can we construct intergovernmental 
organizations that can survive global power transitions, resolve transnational questions, and 
retain democratic legitimacy? How can we blunt the power of the transnational networks linking 
domestic political actors to autocrats abroad? How can democrats – conservative, liberal, and 
socialist alike – unite against existential threats to democracy? How can we rebuild an organic 
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